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Abstract—The problem of adversary target detection and the
subsequent task completion using a heterogeneous network of
resource-constrained UAVs is considered. No prior knowledge
about locations and required resources to identify these targets is
available to the UAVs. In the proposed leader-follower coalition
formation model, the UAV that first locates a target serves as
the coalition leader and selects a group of follower UAVs to
complete the task associated with the identified target. The goal
of the coalition formation is to complete the designated tasks with
minimal resource utilization. Another role of coalition members
is to make the ground station aware of the detected adversary
target by forwarding its signal to the station via a distributed
cooperative relaying scheme. We also propose a reputation-based
mechanism for coalition formation to monitor the cooperative
behavior of the UAVs over the course of time and exclude
potentially untrustworthy UAVs. Simulation results show the
efficiency of the proposed method in forming optimal coalitions
compared to alternative methods.1
Index Terms- Coalition formation, task coordination, un-
known environment, cooperative communication, UAV net-
works, merge-and-split.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advancements in communication and computation
systems allow deployment of large teams of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) to cooperatively accomplish complex mis-
sions that often cannot be performed by a single UAV. Several
features including task coordination and reliable commu-
nications are required to enable interoperability within the
heterogeneous airborne networks, particularly for autonomous
operations and providing on-board data processing during the
mission [1], [2]. These heterogeneous autonomous vehicle
systems could provide a great flexibility to complete com-
pound tasks which are distributed in time and space. Target
detection, data collection, target tracking and prosecution,
imaging, and surveillance are typical examples of tasks that
can be accomplished by a heterogeneous UAV network.
The task allocation problem in multi-agent systems is de-
fined as the process of allocating a set of tasks to groups of
agents to ensure timely and efficient task completions, noting
the individual capabilities of the agents [3]. Several studies
have addressed the complex problem of task assignment using
1 Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release; distribution
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different approaches including mixed integer linear program-
ming [4], [5], dynamic network flow optimization [6], [7],
market-based strategy [8], [9], finite state machine [10], and
multiple choice knapsack problem [11]. While in the majority
of the aforementioned works, the tasks are centrally assigned
to the agents by a base station that has complete knowledge
about the tasks and often the agents’ capabilities; in many
dynamic systems, tasks may appear at unpredictable locations
and times (e.g. target detection in army fields, search and
rescue operations). Hence, a priori knowledge about these
tasks is not always available to the base station. Even when
such centralized task allocation algorithms exist, they are often
computationally intensive even in homogeneous networks and
not easily scalable to systems with a large number of tasks
or agents [12]. Noting the computation and communication
capabilities of modern devices, the agents can be considered
as smart entities with decision-making capabilities. Such cog-
nitive capability facilitates implementation of distributed task
allocation mechanisms by allowing the agents to observe the
environment and monitor the operation of other agents and
properly respond to the observed situations.
Coalition formation game is a class of games, in which
the players cooperate with each other by forming various sub-
groups called coalitions. This class of games has been recently
used in various applications such as task assignment in multi-
agent systems, and communication networks [13]–[17]. In this
paper, we study the problem of cooperative task completion in
a network of heterogeneous UAVs with constrained individual
resources. We assume that a number of targets are distributed
in an unknown environment, where no prior information about
the targets’ time of appearance, and location is available.
We also assume that there is one compound task associated
with each target. The tasks can differ intrinsically based on
the characteristics of their encountered targets in terms of
mobility, speed, position, and the required resources. For
instance, prosecution of a fighter tank or a long-range missile
in a battle field require different sets of equipment. The
objectives of our proposed model include: i) locating the
distributed targets, ii) identifying their associated tasks and
required resources, and iii) completing the identified tasks. In
order to accomplish these goals, we form several coalitions
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of UAVs using a coalition formation method, in which each
coalition will complete a task associated to one target. The
proposed coalition formation model with a leader-follower
structure is designed so that it ensures providing adequate
resources to complete each encountered task while minimally
exceeding the minimum required resources. The proposed
dynamic coalition formation model enables the UAVs to
overcome the limitations of their individual capabilities such
as limited payload and computation, and communication re-
sources. Formation of UAV coalitions can also extend the
coverage area in target tracking and surveillance applications
compared to utilizing individual UAVs. The traveling distances
of the UAVs to the tasks are also taken into account in
forming optimal coalitions to complete the tasks in a timely
manner. Furthermore, in order to get more detailed information
about the identified targets (e.g. an adversary object in a
battlefield), the UAVs in each coalition are required to forward
the broadcast messages by their encountered target to the base
station using a beamforming technique.
In majority of previously reported works on coalition for-
mation for task allocation, the objective is to enhance the
efficiency of the formed groups in task performance noting the
different capabilities available at the coalition members [14],
[16], [18]–[21]. Therefore, the agents often consider a solution
to be optimal when it maximizes the total utilities of the
group in executing the existing tasks with minimum resources.
In these works, it is assumed that all the agents are fully
trustable, and they are obligated to cooperate with one another
by utilizing their initially claimed resources to complete the
tasks. However, this assumption is far too optimistic since
cooperation is not an inherent characteristic of cognitive but
potentially self-interested agents [22], [23]. In this work, we
consider a commercial scenario, in which the UAVs can
belong to different vendors, and they can collect some sort
of monetary benefits for participation in each mission. In
the proposed leader-follower coalition formation model, we
account for both the efficiency in task performance considering
the resource constraints during the coalition formation from
the leaders’ perspective, as well as the individual preferences
of the followers during the followers’ decision making to join
the available coalitions. In such realistic commercial setting,
the UAVs may exhibit selfish behaviors by not utilizing the
resources that they originally committed during the coalition
formation, with the incentive of saving these resources for
future missions to obtain higher benefits. In our proposed
model, we develop a novel reputation-based mechanism that
keeps the record of the UAVs’ cooperative behaviors. The
cumulative credits for UAVs are used to identify the trustable
UAVs during the member selection procedure in coalition
formation. This definition involves a trade-off scenario for the
UAVs. On one hand, they prefer to avoid resource sharing with
others to save their limited available resources, while on the
other hand they need to cooperate with other agents and sustain
a good reputation in order to be selected for next missions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, an overview of the system model for heterogeneous UAV
Fig. 1. Leader-follower coalition formation in a heterogeneous UAV network
to prosecute unknown targets
network is provided and the proposed coalition formation
game-theoretic model is described. The optimization problem
to determine the optimal beamforming vector is described in
Section III. Simulation results are provided in Section IV,
followed by concluding remarks in Section V.
Notation: Vectors and matrices are represented by lower
case and upper case bold letters, respectively. The notations
(.)∗, (.)T and (.)H demonstrate the conjugate, transpose and
conjugate transpose (Hermitian) operations, respectively. The
real value and imaginary values are shown by R{.} and I{.}.
The diagonal matrix A = diag{a} is a matrix whose diagonal
elements are the elements of the vector a. Finally, the function
γL,(x) for x > 0 is defined as
{
x x ≤ 1 + 
L Otherwise , for a given
value of L and small value of , and we have γL(x) = γL,0(x).
II. COALITION FORMATION FOR JOINT TASK ALLOCATION
AND COMMUNICATION OPTIMIZATION
A heterogeneous system of N UAVs, U =
{U1, U2, . . . , UN} is considered, where the UAVs can
form various coalitions to accomplish the dynamic tasks in
the network, as depicted in Fig. 1. Suppose that the ith UAV
is assigned with a capability vector ri = [r1i , r
2
i , . . . , r
Nr
i ]
T
with rji ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , Nr, that identifies the available
resources at this agent assuming that there are Nr different
types of resources in the network. Each resource can be either
consumable or non-consumable. If the ith UAV does not have
resource j, then rji = 0, and if resource j is non-consumable,
then rji = ∞. This vector can vary over time based on the
amount of resources the UAVs consume to complete the
tasks.
A coalition of users, named Sk, is a non-empty subset
of UAVs, Sk ⊂ U that handles task k. It is assumed that
each coalition of UAVs will handle one target at a time.
Moreover, we consider a sparse distribution of targets in the
environment, hence noting the potential distances among the
formed coalitions, it is assumed that each UAV can be only a
member of one of these coalitions at a certain time. Hence, the
coalitions are non-overlapping, meaning that Sk∩Sl = φ. The
coalition of all UAVs, U is the grand coalition and a coalition
that only contains one UAV is called a singleton coalition.
Each coalition Sk is associated with a vector of available
resources which is shown by Rk = [R1k, R
2
k, . . . , R
Nr
k ]
T with
Rjk ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , Nr. For simplicity, one may assume that
the vector Rk is additive over the elements’ resource vectors
in the coalition, i. e. Rk =
∑
j∈Sk ri.
It is assumed that the UAVs operate in an unpredictable
environment, where targets of various types with different
resource requirements appear in random time and locations
and move freely afterwards. Therefore, the base station is not
aware of the potential targets. We assume that all the UAVs
have the capability of searching for new targets in a limited
geographical field, and the target detection is performed by
the UAVs independent of the base station. The procedure
of prosecuting a target is defined as a compound task to
be accomplished by a coalition (the term task can refer to
a set of multiple sub-tasks required to prosecute a target).
The tasks can differ inherently based on the characteristics of
their corresponding targets; hence the number, duration and
location of tasks vary over time. Since each task is associated
to a target, we use the terms target and task interchangeably
throughout this paper.
When a UAV detects a task k, it determines the type
and amount of the resources required to carry out this task,
i. e. Γk = [τ1k , τ
2
k , . . . , τ
Nr
k ]
T , where τ ik ≥ 0. If this UAV
does not have sufficient resources to perform the detected task,
it calls for a coalition formation and serves as the coalition
leader. Since the ground station has no information regarding
the existing targets in the network, the member UAVs of each
coalition are required to listen to the radio communication of
a target and forward it to the ground station [24]. In other
words, a coalition of UAVs is supposed to relay the target’s
message sk with E{s∗ksk} = 1 to the base station.
In our proposed model, first each leader forms an initial
coalition of the available UAVs to maximize the efficiency
in task performance for the encountered target, and send a
request to join the coalition to the selected followers. Then,
the follower UAVs observe the formed coalitions by different
leaders and decide to join the coalition that benefits them
the most. The details of the proposed coalition formation
algorithm is described in Section II-C as well as in Fig.
2. In order for a leaders to form a coalition, it takes into
account several factors including i) collecting the required
resources to perform a task, ii) traveling time of the UAVs
to the task, and iii) the quality of service (QoS) of target
message’s communication at the base station. The goal of this
combinational complex optimization problem is to perform
the tasks in timely and resource efficient manner. This goal
suggests that the members of a newly formed coalitions
should collectively have all the required resources to perform
the encountered task, while minimally surpassing the task
requirements. The latter objective can be considered as the
cost of coalition, hence this coalition formation game is not
super-additive. Other associated costs to coalition formation
include a higher chance of UAVs’ collisions when having more
UAVs in a coalition, as well as heavier signaling loads for the
members to exchange the necessary information.
Another criterion in coalition formation from the leaders’
perspective is the deadline to complete a task. Hence, the
leaders need to take into account the traveling time of the
UAVs to the task in order to choose the coalition members.
For this purpose, δi,k is defined as the traveling time of the
ith member of coalition to target k location that should be less
than or equal to a preferred threshold fδ(ρ) as a function of
field radius ρ.
A key contribution of the proposed model is to identify the
reliable UAVs by the leaders to join the coalitions and filter
out any UAVs with selfish behavior. 2 This is facilitated by
defining a cumulative cooperation credit for each UAV that
indicates its cooperative behavior in terms of resource sharing
during task completion over the course of time. On one hand,
since the leaders prefer to select the potential followers with
higher credits, the UAVs are motivated to maintain a good
cooperative credit. On the other hand, the follower UAVs
similar to other types of cognitive agents may act selfishly and
avoid consuming their resources after joining a coalition. The
incentive behind this behavior is to save their limited available
resources for future missions to earn more monetary benefits.
The details of cooperation credit is defined in section II-B.
Here we describe the details of the coalition formation
process. First, the coalition leader broadcasts a proposal to
form a coalition. Then, the UAVs who possess at least one of
the required resources can respond to this request by reporting
their available resources as well as their current positions.
This is called the bid process. The coalition leader then
evaluates all the bids by assessing the resources offered by
the volunteers, their estimated arrival time, their cooperative
credits as well as the provided QoSs for the relaying services
during the formation process to determine if a coalition can
be formed to complete the encountered task. If a coalition
can not be formed, it informs the UAVs, otherwise it gets
back to the selected UAVs with information about the tasks
2It is worth mentioning that such networks are prone to suffer from both
malicious/intruding UAVs as well as selfish ones. The focus of this work is
to prevent potential selfish behavior of legitimate non-altruistic UAVs in not
spending their resources after joining a coalition to encourage cooperation
among them, while studying the required authentication methods to identify
intruding UAVs, or preventing all potential malicious acts of these UAVs (e.g.
reporting false information about their available resources or location) is out
of the scope of this paper.
Fig. 2. State diagram of the proposed coalition formation.
(e.g required resources, and location). The UAVs that are not
selected by the potential leader go back to the search mode.
When a UAV receives multiple coalition formation requests,
it considers two factors of expected increase in its cooperative
credit based on information it received from the leaders about
required resources for the tasks as well as its distance to the
targets in order to decide which coalition to join. The coalition
formation process is summarized in Fig. 2. In Section II-A,
the cooperative communication method to relay the target’s
message to the ground station is described, followed by the
definition of the cooperative credit and formulation of the
proposed coalition formation algorithm in Sections II-B and
II-C.
A. Cooperative Communications at Member UAVs of Each
Coalition
Amplify-and-Forward (AF) is a widely used relaying
method in communication networks due to its simplicity and
low-complexity. Beamforming is a technique based on AF
relaying, where a set of relay nodes amplify and shift the
phase of a transmitter’s signal and rebroadcast it such that
they add up constructively, while interfering signals add up
destructively. In order to relay the target’s message to the
ground station, a beamforming scenario is proposed in which
each UAV in the coalition multiplies the received target’s
signal to a complex weight number and rebroadcasts it (AF
relaying). A common assumption of knowledge of Channel
State Information (CSI) in the system is followed in this model
[25], [26]. Assume that hTU = [hTU0 , hTU1 , . . . , hTUNS ]
T
is the vector of instantaneous channel coefficients between
the target and the coalition members, where NS = |S| − 1.
Likewise, hUB = [hU0B , hU1B , . . . , hUNSB ]
T is the vector of
channel coefficients between the coalition members and the
base station. Here, the index 0 represents the leader and the
indices i = 1, 2, . . . , NS represent the coalition members. It
is assumed that the leader has the knowledge of instantaneous
reciprocal channel vectors, (i. e. hTU and hUB) and is
responsible for calculating the optimum beamforming and
notifying the members of its coalition.
If sT denotes the transmit signal, the vector of the received
signal at the coalition can be written as:
x = hTUsT + n, (1)
where n ∼ N (0,Σ 12 ), with diagonal covariance matrix Σ, is
an additive zero mean Gaussian noise vector at the coalition
members. It is assumed that each UAV is aware of its local
noise characteristics and performs the whitening process be-
fore the beamforming. Hence, the whitened received signal at
UAVs can be written as:
x˜ = Σ−
1
2 x = Σ−
1
2 hTUsT + Σ
− 12 n, (2)
The ith coalition member, i = 0, 1, . . . , NS , multiplies the
received target signal by a complex weight w∗i and then relays
it. The broadcasted signal by the coalition members can be
written as follows, assuming w = [w0, w1, . . . , wNS ]
T :
t = WH x˜ = WHΣ−
1
2 hTUsT + W
HΣ−
1
2 n, (3)
where W = diag(w). The received signal at the base station
is:
yB = h
H
UBW
HΣ−
1
2 hTUsT + h
H
UBW
HΣ−
1
2 n + ν
= wHHHUBΣ
− 12 hTUsT + wHHHUBΣ
− 12 n + ν, (4)
where, HUB = diag(hUB) and ν ∼ N (0, σ2) is white
Gaussian noise at the base station receiver. Therefore, the
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) at the base station can be
expressed by:
SNRB =
wHkkHw
wHHHUBHUBw + σ
2
, (5)
where k = HHUBΣ
− 12 hTU . Each UAV (including the leader)
has a limited energy to forward the target’s signal. Using (3),
the power consumption at each coalition member for relaying
the target’s signal can be written as:
Pi,R = [w
H ]i[Σ
− 12 ]i,i[hTU ]i[hHTU ]i[Σ
− 12 ]i,i[w]i
+ [wH ]i[w]i (6)
where i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , NS . We assume that the individual
transmission power of UAV i is below a certain threshold,
denoted by Pmaxi .
B. Cooperation Credit for UAVs
To monitor the cooperative behavior of the UAVs, a cumu-
lative cooperative credit is defined for each UAV based on
the amount of resources that it utilizes for a specific task.
We assume that the credit of all UAVs are initialized to an
equal initial credit C(0)i = C > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . After
completing a task, each UAV’s credit is calculated using the
following steps:
1) First, the credit of UAV i at time n is updated as
C˜
(n)
i =
{
C
(n−1)
i + ∆Ci
(n) If ∃k| Ui ∈ Sk,
C
(n−1)
i Otherwise
(7)
Here, the change in credit ∆Ci(n) is defined by:
∆Ci
(n) =
τk∑
l∈Sk al
ai (8)
where τk =
∑Nr
j=1 τ
j
k represents a value of task k
and ai =
∑Nr
j=1 γ1(
rji
τjk
) denotes the effective resource
contribution of each UAV.
2) If all C˜(n)i for i = 1, 2, . . . , N are equal, then we set
C
(n)
i = C to reset the credits. Otherwise:
C
(n)
i = C
C˜
(n)
i − C˜min
C˜max − C˜min
(9)
where C˜max = maxi=1,2,...,N {C˜(n)i } and C˜min =
mini=1,2,...,N {C˜(n)i }.
Therefore, the credits in each step are scaled to values within
[0, C] range. After the completion of each task, the updated
credits are broadcasted by the coalition leader to be used for
future coalition formations. For the sake of simplicity, we drop
the superscripts (n) hereafter.
C. Proposed Leader-Follower Coalition Formation
In the proposed coalition formation method, first the leaders
select their coalition members among the available candidates
to maximize their corresponding coalition’s utility function to
enhance the efficiency in completing their encountered task
noting the resource constraints. The coalition value for the kth
leader is defined in such a way to: i) assure the existence of
required resources to handle a task, ii) avoid over-spending
the resources on a specific task, iii) guarantee the timely
completion of the task, iv) provide the required quality of
communication to relay target’s message, and also v) select
the reliable UAVs as follow:
v(Sk) = α1
NS∑
i=1
Ci + α2γ−L
(SNRThr
SNRSk
)
+ α3
Nr∑
j=1
γ−L
(Rjk
τ jk
)
− γL
(maxi|Ui∈Sk{δi,k}
fδ(ρ)
)
(10)
for a large enough positive value of L. Here, the design
parameters α1, α2, and α3 > 0 represent the importance of the
credit and quality of communication compared to the resource
optimization goal for the leader. Also, SNRThr represents the
minimum required SNRSk to successfully relay the target’s
message to the base station. It is worth mentioning that the
maximum function in last term of (10) is used to ensure that
even the UAV with the latest time of arrival will be at task
position in time. It should be noted that the k’th leader is a
member of the coalition Sk.
In order to find the optimal coalition which maximizes the
leader’s utility function (10), a search over all 2Lk possible
coalitions is required, where Lk denotes the number of poten-
tial follower UAVs who responded to the proposal of leader
k. To avoid such extensive search, a low complexity merge-
and-split algorithm is proposed. In this method, each leader k
separately starts from an initial state where the set of UAVs
who responded to its proposal is partitioned into Lk singleton
coalitions. Afterward, in each step, two chosen coalitions Ski
and Skj are merged if v(Ski
⋃Skj) > v(Ski) + v(Skj). Here,
since the value of the coalitions which does not include the
leader is zero, the only possible merge happens if a singleton
coalition {u} and the coalition Sk which contains k’th leader
satisfy the condition v(Sk
⋃{u}) > v(Sk). Also, if for a non-
singleton coalition S there exists a partition of two coalitions
Ski and Skj such that v(S = Ski
⋃Skj) < v(Ski) + v(Skj),
then S splits into Ski and Skj 3. At each step of the merge
and split algorithm, the optimum value of the SNRB in the
utility function (10) for the coalitions should be calculated,
as described in details in the next section. It is worth men-
tioning that the merge and split algorithm is used to obtain a
suboptimal coalition solution of (10) with lower complexity.
When the changes in coalition values over consequent rounds
become below a threshold, the coalition with highest coalition
3Each leader considers itself as a constant member of all coalitions under
evaluation.
Algorithm 1 Coalition formation algorithm
1: Initializing coalitions . Each leader k starts
from a partition of the singleton coalitions of UAVs who
responded to its proposal
2: Merge-and-split coalition formation algorithm by the
leader . for all available UAVs for this task
3: while Change in coalition values is greater than  do
4: while Si and Sj exist with v(Si
⋃Sj) > v(Si)+v(Sj)
do
5: Merge Si and Sj .
6: end while
7: while Si and Sj exist such that: v(S = Si
⋃Sj) <
v(Si) + v(Sj) do
8: Split S into partitions Si and Sj .
9: end while
10: if There is a split then
11: go to 4.
12: end if
13: end while
14: Select the coalition with highest coalition value, notify the
UAVs of this selected coalition
15: if All selected potential followers said Yes then
16: Terminate
17: else
18: Exclude the ones with No response, go to 3
19: end if
20: Selecting the best formation request from different leaders
by each selected follower
21: if Received only one formation request then
22: Say Yes to that leader
23: else
24: Say Yes to the leader of coalition that maximizes (11),
say No to other leaders
25: end if
value would be selected from the leader’s perspective and the
members will be notified.
When the optimal coalitions from the leaders’ perspective
are formed, the formation requests will be sent out to the se-
lected UAVs. If a potential follower receives multiple requests
from different leaders, it prefers to join the coalition which
benefits it the most. The utility function of the followers is
defined as:
vp(Ui,Sk) = ∆Ci − α4δi,k, (11)
where ∆Ci and δi,k are the expected credit (knowing the
required resources for the encountered task) and traveling time
to task k if user Ui joins the coalition Sk, respectively. α4 is a
design parameter that indicates the importance of the traveling
cost compared to the change in credit. The proposed coalition
formation algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Stability of the proposed coalition formation algorithm:
The proposed coalition formation process includes a series of
merge-and-split coalition formation steps. After each stage of
merge-and-split coalition formation, the leader sends out the
requests and collects the followers’ responses. If all responses
are affirmative, the algorithm stops; otherwise, a new merge-
and-split is executed that keeps the current members with
positive responses, and evaluates the new available UAVs. As
such, in order to show the stability of the algorithm, it is
sufficient to show that: i) the number of sequential rounds
of the algorithm is finite, and ii) each merge-and-split stage is
stable. The first is ensured, because at each round, we exclude
the members with no interest in joining the formed coalition,
and therefore after at most ms iterations the algorithm stops,
where ms is the number of UAVs with negative response to
join a coalition. The second condition is also satisfied since as
proved in [27], the formed coalitions by the leaders are Dhp-
stable. This is due to the fact that the only type of allowed
membership changes are based on single or possibly multiple
merge-and-splits (i. e. a UAV or a group of them are only
allowed to leave a partition by means of merges or splitting).
In Section III, the details of the inner optimization problem
to determine the optimal SNR of target’s signal at the base
station for a coalition of interest is described.
III. COMMUNICATION OPTIMIZATION
The optimization from the leaders’ perspective is to maxi-
mize the coalition value (10) by searching over the coalitions,
i. e. S, and determine the optimum beamforming scheme,
i. e. w to optimize SNRB . For each coalition, the optimal
value of (5), SNRoptS can be obtained via the following inner
optimization problem:
max
w
wHkkHw
wHHHUBHUBw + σ
2
(12)
[wH ]i
(
[Σ−
1
2 ]i,i[hTU ]i[h
H
TU ]i[Σ
− 12 ]i,i + 1
)
[w]i
≤ Pmaxi , i = 0, 1, . . . , Nc
A bisection method is described in [28] to solve the fractional
Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Program (QCQP)s such
as the optimization problem in (12) that can be rewritten as:
max
w,t
t (13)
[wH ]i
(
[Σ−
1
2 ]i,i[hTU ]i[h
H
TU ]i[Σ
− 12 ]i,i + 1
)
[w]i
≤ Pmaxi , i = 0, 1, . . . , Nc
wHkkHw ≥ twHHHUBHUBw + tσ2,
where t is an auxiliary variable. In the bisection method, given
the value of t ≥ 0, the following feasibility check problem is
investigated:
Find w (14)
[wH ]i
(
[Σ−
1
2 ]i,i[hTU ]i[h
H
TU ]i[Σ
− 12 ]i,i + 1
)
[w]i
≤ Pmaxi , i = 0, 1, . . . , Nc
wHkkHw ≥ twHHHUBHUBw + tσ2.
If the problem described in (14) is feasible, then the optimal
solution of problem (13), i. e. SNRoptS , is less than or equal
t; otherwise SNRoptS ≥ t. The variable t is up limited by tup
which is obtained in the following lemma.
Lemma III.1. tup = kHQ−1k is an up limit for objective in
optimization problem (12).
Proof. Please see Appendix A. 
Using Lemma 1 and by assuming δ as the absolute pre-
cision of the final objective function value, the iteration’s
complexity order of the bisection method can be written as
O(log( tupδ )). The feasibility problem (14) can be solved using
the SemiDefinite Programming (SDP) relaxation method. A
drawback of this method is dealing with matrix rank deduction
in SDP relaxation problems which increases the complexity
of the solution. As an alternative, [26] provides a technique
to convert such problems to the Second Order Cone Pro-
gramming (SOCP) problems. The key point is to notice if
wopt is an optimal solution to the feasibility problem (14),
then for any arbitrary real number θ, w˜ = woptej∠θ is
also an optimal solution. Therefore, it is possible to assume
that wHHHUBΣ
− 12 hTU is a non-negative real number. By
considering this constraint, the feasibility problem (14) can be
rewritten as the following SOCP problem for a given t ≥ 0:
Find w (15)
[wH ]i
(
[Σ−
1
2 ]i,i[hTU ]i[h
H
TU ]i[Σ
− 12 ]i,i + 1
)
[w]i
≤ Pmaxi i = 0, 1, . . . , Nc
wHk ≥
√
twHHHUBHUBw + tσ
2
R{wHHHUBΣ−
1
2 hTU} ≥ 0
I{wHHHUBΣ−
1
2 hTU} = 0.
The feasibility check problem (15) can be effectively solved
using the cvx convex optimization toolbox. By considering the
cubic complexity order of the SOCP method, the complexity
order of the communication optimization can be expressed as
(|S|3 log( tupδ )).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to validate the performance of proposed method,
a scenario consisting of two leader- and six follower- UAVs
is considered. The UAVs are uniformly located in a R3
region. It is assumed that the leaders do not carry out the
required resources to perform the identified tasks individually
and they call out to form coalitions. Five types of resources
are considered and the amount of each resource at each UAV
as well as the required resources for each task are generated
randomly. The traveling time is generated proportional to
the distance of the UAVs to the corresponding target. All
communication channels are generated by zero mean Gaussian
variables with variance proportional to the inverse distance
between the corresponding transmitter and receiver antennas.
Figure 3 demonstrates the positions of UAVs in the net-
work and the formed coalitions in a numerical experiment.
For this example, the stable formed coalitions are as S1 =
{U1, U3, U5, U6} and S2 = {U2, U4, U7, U8}, where coalitions
S1 and S2 complete the tasks 1 and 2, respectively. In this
figure, we show the UAVs by notation of Si{Uj} that refers to
the UAV number j is in coalition Si. The proposed algorithm
Fig. 3. The stable formed coalitions to complete two identified tasks in an
experiment with two leader- and six follower- UAVs
has been examined for different scenarios, where the stable
coalitions are formed after few rounds. The available resources
in coalition S1 provided by each UAV as well as the required
resources to complete T1 are listed in this figure.
Table I shows the comparison of available resources in
coalition S1 versus the required resources to complete the
task encountered by this coalition. As shown in this table, the
summation of available resources in coalition S1 are higher
than the required resources for task 1 which guarantees that
this task can be completed by the members of coalition S1.
Moreover, to evaluate the efficiency of our proposed coalition
formation method in a resource constraint network, we define
an Efficiency Factor as E. F. =
∑Nr
j=1{
∑
i∈S1 r
j
i /τ
j
1}/Nr.
This factor evaluates the performance of the formed coalitions
in terms of resource allocation efficiency, where the closer
value of E. F. to 1 means the more efficient the algorithm
is in terms of not over-spending the resources for a particular
task. In our example, the average E. F. value is 1.11, which is
fairly close to 1. In Fig. 4, the efficiency factor of the proposed
method after forming stable coalitions is compared to the
scenario in which the closest UAVs are assigned to the targets
without considering the resources offered by these UAVs. As
shown in this figure, our proposed method outperforms the
case of distance-based UAVs selection for different system
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND THE REQUIRED
RESOURCES IN COALITION S1
Available
resources in S1∑
i∈S1
rji
Required
resources
for T1
(τ j1 )
∑
i∈S1
rji ≥ τ j1
∑
i∈S1
r
j
i
τ
j
1
resource 1: 2.37 2.37
√
1.00
resource 2: 2.87 2.78
√
1.03
resource 3: 2.90 2.51
√
1.16
resource 4: 1.36 1.33
√
1.02
resource 5: 1.53 1.15
√
1.33
E. F. =
∑Nr
j=1{
∑
i∈S1 r
j
i /τ
j
1}/Nr = 1.11
Fig. 4. Efficiency factor for the proposed coalition formation method
compared to the case of selecting the closest UAVs.
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settings over the course of time.
Figure 5 evaluates the performance of our proposed coali-
tion formation method in identifying the potential selfish UAVs
by showing the change in cooperative credit of six follower-
UAVs over time. The credits are normalized to be in the range
of [0, 1]. In this scenario, we assume that UAVs, U5 and U6 are
selfish in the sense that they do not consume the resources they
initially committed after joining a coalition. As seen in Fig.
5, the credits of these selfish UAVs, C5 and C6 significantly
decrease over time, meaning that these selfish users will not
be selected by the leaders in the next rounds of coalition
formation. It is worth mentioning that other factors including
changes in UAVs’ location and dynamic nature of the task
requirements can also play a role in small variations in agents’
credits that may result in credit reduction for trustable agents.
The slight reduction of credits of U3 and U4 is an example of
this fact.
V. CONCLUSION
A leader-follower coalition formation game is developed
for distributed task allocation and optimizing the cooperative
communication between the detected targets and the base
station in a heterogeneous network of UAVs. A reputation-
based mechanism is developed to monitor the cooperative
behavior of UAVs and filter out the selfish UAVs who have
not accumulated sufficient collaboration credits. The proposed
methodology enables optimizing several factors including the
timely completion of the tasks, and preserving the network
resources from the leader’s perspectives, while it benefits
follower UAVs by lowering their travel times to join the
coalitions. The simulation results show the convergence of
the proposed method in forming stable coalitions with high
resource efficiency factors to complete the encountered tasks.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: The optimization problem becomes feasible
if and only if the matrix kkH − tHHUBHUB is nonnega-
tive definite. Since the matrix Q = HHUBHUB is positive
semi-definite, the matrix Q−
1
2 (kkH − tHHUBHUB)Q−
1
2 =
Q−
1
2 kkHQ−
1
2 − tI must be nonnegative definite. That results
t ≤ λmax(Q− 12 kkHQ− 12 ) = kHQ−1k.
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